Angola: Lourenco's Venezuela Problem

What happened: Neither President Joao Lourenco nor any government official has issued a formal statement on US operations in Venezuela despite long-standing relations with the latter.

Why it matters: The silence suggests that Lourenco is assessing his options and trying to avoid hindering bilateral ties with the Trump administration, which could disturb support for the Lobito Corridor project and IEC operations.

What happens next: Any eventual response will be very diplomatic to avoid creating tension. In the meantime, we expect foreign policy to become an important element of the MPLA internal election in 2026, fostering deep divisions that Russia and China may seek to take advantage of.

President Joao Lourenco — and the rest of his administration — notably did not make any official statements about the US forces’ capture of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, despite long-standing ties with the latter. The events in Venezuela and Lourenco’s silence have sparked intense debate in Angola.

Worsening the tension, Venezuelan Foreign Affairs Minister Yvan Gil Pinto announced that he had received messages of support from Angola, though he did not say from whom, or whether the messages were personal or institutional. Pinto visited Angola back in March 2025, where he met his Angolan counterpart, Tete Antonio.

These developments come during a period of warming bilateral relations with the Trump administration, mostly based on American IECs’ long-standing operations in Angola, financial and diplomatic backing for the Lobito Corridor, and support for Lourenco’s efforts in engaging the DRC leadership amid the conflict in the eastern part of the country.

Our contacts say that the government and the wider ruling MPLA are holding discussions about their approach to the issue, which explains the lack of an official statement. In our view, we believe Lourenco’s silence on the operations in Venezuela is aimed at avoiding looking like he is taking a side. He does not want to risk damaging warming ties with the US or long-standing relations with countries like Venezuela.

Lourenco knows that the Trump administration has little tolerance for countries that favor other geopolitical blocs over ties with Washington. He is also aware that American IECs play a vital role in Angola’s heavily oil revenue-dependent economy — a break in relations may worsen risk perceptions on future investments in the sector. Conversely, gaining Trump’s favor in this situation could place Luanda favorably for future commercial diplomacy.

What’s more, the most viable alternative to US investment and support is China, Angola’s largest creditor, though Lourenco is seeking to reduce Angola’s dependency. Notably, China has already committed resources to the Tazara railway, a competitor to the Lobito Corridor.

Lourenco is now likely assessing whether his pragmatic foreign policy approach is sustainable under Trump. These concerns are more important than the eventual price impact of Venezuelan oil entering international markets, which is somewhat distant in the future.

Since starting his second term in 2022, Lourenco has seemingly prioritized ties with the US over China, including meeting with then-President Joe Biden in the Oval Office, who returned the visit one year later. Lourenco even boycotted the September 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.

However, this came after the Angolan and Chinese governments agreed to elevate ties to a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership,” and Luanda has continued to sign deals with Chinese companies as part of Lourenco’s push to play US-China competition to accelerate inflows.

Additionally, Lourenco's silence about Trump's actions in Venezuela has created an opening for his critics in the MPLA, who did not approve of his cozying up to the US and want to remind the party of its history with Venezuela and Cuba. These feelings sometimes fuel maneuvers for political gains, especially if they overlap with those of influential individuals who lost influence under Lourenco, or were even targeted by judicial authorities since he took office. This sets the stage for foreign affairs to take center stage ahead of the party leadership contest.

Such individuals include members of the late Jose Eduardo dos Santos entourage who remain influential and resourceful, such as General Manuel Helder Vieira Dias (Kopelipa), former Vice President and Sonangol Chair Manuel Vicente (see our Featured Personality) and General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento (Dino).

Kopelipa and Dino have faced corruption charges; the former was acquitted, and the latter was sentenced to prison. Both men were added to the US Treasury Department’s list of specially designated nationals in 2021. Thus, their opinion of closer ties with the US is unlikely to be positive.

Vicente is under investigation over corrupt dealings involving Kopelipa and Dino. During his term at Sonangol, the NOC partnered with its Venezuelan and Cuban counterparts to explore oil in Venezuela. Sonangol left the JV in 2023, citing risks — the timing notably coincided with closer ties with the Biden administration.

We expect officials like Kopelipa, Dino and Vicente to step up political engagement in the MPLA against Lourenco, using the argument that Angola must resist meddling from the US — with developments in Venezuela in mind — and relaunch ties with traditional partners. On the other hand, China and Russia may seek to take advantage of these internal divisions to gain an edge amid the warming US ties.

The outcome of the 2026 party leadership race will provide important signposts over foreign policy options and Trump’s posture towards Angola. If the likes of Kopelipa and Vicente are perceived as retaining influence in the MPLA after 2026, then the Trump administration may lose favor for Angola. This could manifest as not facilitating investment or loans, such as the one the US Development Finance Corporation approved for the consortium operating the Lobito Corridor.