Turkey: Corridors of Opportunity

What happened: Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar proposed three pipeline projects to bring energy resources from the Gulf and Central Asia to Turkey.

Why it matters: Turkey has long pushed for these types of infrastructure projects, but sees a particular opportunity with the Hormuz crisis to bolster its energy security, ambitions as an energy trading hub and economic ties with Gulf states.

What happens next: The government will continue to seek new energy sources through creative means, as the crisis presents both short-term supply security and inflationary concerns, but also long-term opportunities to enhance its position in the region.

In a 9 April interview, Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar (see our Featured Personality) proposed three pipeline projects to move Iraqi, Saudi, Qatari and Turkmen energy through Jordan and Syria to Turkey. He argued that the region “needs to formulate a new structure for the energy system” in light of the ongoing Hormuz crisis.

The first proposal is an oil pipeline from Basra in southern Iraq that would tie 85-90% of Iraq’s crude output to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline in the north that connects to Turkey. This would potentially include an additional pipeline from Syria.

The second is a gas pipeline across the Caspian Sea to connect Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan.

The third is the most ambitious: constructing a gas pipeline from Qatar that passes through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria before ending in Turkey.

Old Proposals for New Times

Since the 1970s, Turkey has been working to build new energy routes through its territory — none of these proposals are new.

Iraq built a pipeline in the 1970s that connected its southern fields to the north and enabled the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to Turkey to reach its 1.5mn bpd nameplate capacity in the late 1980s, but it fell into disuse after the First Gulf War.

The Turkmenistan pipeline has been under discussion for years, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and Europe’s desire to pivot away from Russian gas supplies.

Discussions about a Qatar pipeline date to before the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, but were largely confined to unofficial narratives rather than documented government planning. Until this year, Qatar was satisfied with using flexible seaborne exports.

Bayraktar hopes to take advantage of the current crisis and revive these proposals. (Notably, this dovetails with other Turkish efforts to attract capital and businesses from Dubai to Istanbul with tax breaks and other incentives.)

Turkish Initiatives

Over the decades, Turkey has proved that it is a reliable transit partner, hosting pipelines from Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Russia. Its willingness to play this key role as a transit node reflects its genuine need for as many supplies as it can get.

A substantial net importer, Turkey is currently suffering from the secondary effects of Hormuz’s closure. Prices for gasoline and diesel have already risen, and on 4 April, the country instituted 20-25% increases in natural gas and electricity prices, the first upward revisions in over a year. Energy price shocks risk imperiling Turkey’s fragile economic recovery, producing budgetary challenges and reversing progress in taming inflation.

So far, Bayraktar’s proposals appear one-sided, with no media or governments from the proposed partner countries having publicly expressed interest. It is telling that Bayraktar pitched them only in the Turkish and Qatari press. Israel will certainly want a say and argue that new pipelines should run from Saudi Arabia and Qatar through Jordan to its Mediterranean shores. Although Arab states in the region might view Turkey as a more politically palatable partner than Israel, the latter has demonstrated overlapping energy interests with the Gulf.

We expect the Turkish proposals will be seriously considered in Baghdad, Doha and Riyadh, as there is clear logic to building new bypass infrastructure around Hormuz. Although they are expensive, global demand for energy is only growing, and reliance on a single chokepoint has left the entire system vulnerable, revealing its inherent fragility. Turkey’s plans would offer security and sovereignty through diversification and redundancy.

Assessing the Proposals

Of the three plans, the best immediate option to get new supplies onto the market and into Europe is an Iraq extension. Iraq’s southern fields, which account for 85-90% of its overall production, have been shut-in since early March. This option will likely get Western backing due to Turkish national oil company TPAO’s recent partnerships with Western majors that are in Iraq and keen to secure alternative paths to market.

The other two projects are technically feasible but politically problematic.

Although creating a new export route for Qatari gas is as urgent as for Iraq’s oil, crossing Syria to do so would represent a massive bet on that country’s future. Syria repeatedly closed oil pipelines from Iraq and Syria from the 1950s to the 1970s, and while the new government in Damascus may appear friendly to regional cooperation today, Syria remains structurally fragile and divided, with numerous domestic groups opposing the central government.

Meanwhile, Russia and China have long blocked a connection from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan. US support for the Zanzegur Corridor bolsters the prospects for an expansion of the gas pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey, but this still does not resolve the lack of a trans-Caspian connection.

Thinking Big

After President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with US President Donald Trump in September 2025, Turkey has pivoted away from buying Russian oil but finds itself increasingly constrained in the post-Hormuz environment. However the latest pipeline proposals end up progressing, they are a reminder that Turkish officials are eager to entertain big ideas about the region’s energy transport challenges. Investors willing to consider similarly ambitious bets will find a keen partner in Ankara.